The United States government's decision to expand the use of electronic monitoring devices for immigrants subject to the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program has opened a new front of contention regarding the limits of the country's immigration policy.

In June 2026, a group of asylum seekers sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and CustomsEnforcement (ICE) arguing that the agency had begun imposing tracking devices in a generalized manner, without proper individual assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the measure. In this way, the circumstance causes unnecessary harm to those trying to remain legally in the country.

The central point of the controversy is the change in the logic that guides its application. For years, the use of ankle bracelets and other tracking devices was presented as a less restrictive alternative to physical detention. The new policy, however, seems to indicate an expansion of surveillance over people who, in many cases, were already regularly complying with the conditions imposed by the government. In this sense, the legal process represents a dispute over the legality of an administrative policy and a questioning of the extent to which the State can expand control mechanisms over individuals without any concrete change having occurred in their immigration status.

 

From alternatives to detention to expanded surveillance

The ATD program was conceived as a way to monitor immigrants involved in immigration processes without necessarily subjecting them to physical detention. The proposal, at least in its original formulation, had a pragmatic and humanitarian dimension: people who did not represent a risk to public safety or a high risk of flight could remain in their communities while awaiting their proceedings before the Immigration Court.

Data gathered by the National Immigration Forum helps to understand why electronic monitoring has gained ground in this structure. In 2018, more than 38,000 immigrants used electronic ankle bracelets, corresponding to approximately 45% of the participants in ICE's main alternatives to detention program, the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP). The same survey indicated that immigration detention cost, on average, more than US$200 per person per day, while community supervision and electronic monitoring programs could cost only a few dollars a day. In addition, detention alternatives programs had hearing attendance rates exceeding 90% in various contexts.

The economic logic, therefore, helped consolidate electronic monitoring as an alternative to the costly immigration detention infrastructure. However, the recent expansion substantially modifies this relationship. According to documents related to the process and the Bloomberg report, the number of people using electronic monitoring devices reportedly jumped from approximately 17,000 to nearly 50,000 after the adoption of the new ICE guidelines. At the same time, the total number of participants in the detention alternatives program reportedly remained relatively stable. This data is particularly relevant. While the total number of people under surveillance has not increased proportionally, the number of individuals required to wear physical tracking devices has grown notably, this phenomenon does not appear to be simply a response to a greater need for control. It is possibly a change in the intensity of surveillance applied to people who were already subject to state monitoring mechanisms. It is precisely this transformation that underlies the legal action. The authors argue that ICE has abandoned the individualized assessment that historically should have determined the conditions for release and has adopted a virtually automatic policy of escalating surveillance. In practice, the use of GPS ceases to be an exceptional measure linked to specific circumstances and becomes a standardized condition for a much larger number of people.

 

The politics behind the numbers: the moment when control becomes an everyday experience

The human dimension of this change becomes clearer in the accounts of people subjected to monitoring. A report by the SahanJournal follows the case of an asylum seeker identified by the pseudonym Yolanda, who had complied with ISAP requirements for approximately a decade. Initially, her monitoring took place through monthly phone calls. Later, she began sending photographs through an app and, still later, was required to attend the program in person more frequently. Despite her history of compliance with the requirements, she was subjected to wearing an electronic ankle bracelet.

The report also describes an episode in which Yolanda and her two children were detained for hours when they attended an appointment related to the supervision program. Although they were released after the authorities verified the existence of a pending asylum application, the immediate consequence was the imposition of the monitoring device.

The report exposes the existing asymmetry between the experience of the State and the experience of the individual. For the authorities, the ankle bracelet may appear as an administrative tool of control. For the person who uses it, however, the measure modifies their relationship with public space, with work, and with their own family. The uncertainty about the reasons for imposing the device (and about the time during which it should be used) also contributes to transforming monitoring into a permanent experience of insecurity.

This dimension is not new. The National Immigration Forum had already documented that people subjected to electronic monitoring reported physical and psychological impacts including inflammation, pain, bleeding, injuries, numbness, and emotional distress. The document also highlights the symbolic dimension of the ankle bracelet: Central American immigrants often refer to these devices as "grilletes," or "handcuffs".

From this perspective, the association between electronic monitoring and crime also has material consequences: according to the same survey, individuals authorized to work may face difficulties in obtaining or maintaining employment because of the stigma associated with the ankle bracelet.

Conditions such as geographical restrictions, unannounced home visits, curfews, and technical equipment malfunctions can hinder the maintenance of a professional routine. In one of the reported cases, an asylum seeker lost his job after an automatic message emitted by the device was triggered in front of his employer. The situation is particularly contradictory when applied to people who are authorized to work and who have not been convicted of crimes. The policy, in this context, produces a form of social punishment without necessarily having a criminal conviction to justify it. The device then publicly communicates a suspicion that may not correspond to the individual's background or legal situation.

 

The problem of proportionality and consent

One of the main points of controversy lies in the idea that electronic monitoring is a consensual measure. The government's institutional language often describes program participants as people who have "consented" to some form of monitoring in exchange for remaining out of detention.

However, this interpretation is questionable when considering the concrete position of asylum seekers. The possibility of choosing between a form of surveillance and detention does not necessarily constitute a free choice, especially when the individual is in a position of extreme legal and economic vulnerability. The immigrant may formally accept participation in a program, but this does not mean that they have real freedom to negotiate the type, intensity, or duration of monitoring.

The problem becomes even more evident when the person has already been complying with the requirements imposed by ICE. In these cases, the imposition of a more invasive measure does not necessarily stem from a change in behavior. The complaint filed by the applicants themselves argues that many of them have not had any change in their circumstances that would justify the escalation of release conditions.

This issue is central to the debate on proportionality. The use of a GPS ankle bracelet allows for the monitoring of an individual's location and movements in real time. In addition, the devices can issue alerts if they are removed, damaged, or taken out of a specific area. The tracking capability, therefore, represents a significantly greater intrusion into daily life than less invasive mechanisms, such as phone calls or communication apps.

The technological evolution of the program itself shows that less intrusive alternatives exist. Austin Kocher, a researcher who follows ICE's electronic monitoring policy, points out that the agency uses different technologies, including phone calls, smartphone apps, GPS devices installed on the ankle, and equipment used on the wrist. According to his analysis, the SmartLINK app, used for facial recognition and geolocation, reached a much larger number of people than GPS ankle bracelets.

The difference involves a political choice about the degree of intrusion considered acceptable. A monitoring app can be criticized for its own privacy implications, but the physical ankle bracelet adds a bodily, visible, and socially stigmatizing dimension to digital surveillance. For this reason, the adoption of a more invasive device should, in principle, be linked to a concrete justification. When this justification disappears and monitoring becomes widespread, the technology ceases to function merely as a supervisory tool and comes to represent a structural expansion of the State's power of control.

 

The economic dimension of expansion: when private companies benefit from increased migration surveillance

The discussion about the devices also has an economic dimension that cannot be ignored. The expansion of electronic monitoring occurs within a system in which private companies directly participate in the administration of migration supervision programs. Bloomberg highlights the participation of BI Incorporated, a subsidiary of GEO Group, in the administration of ISAP. The report also points out that physical monitoring devices represent a higher-margin activity for the company than technologies such as SmartLINK. GEO Group itself reportedly informed investors about its preparedness for a possible expansion in demand for electronic ankle bracelets. This dynamic creates the following economic incentive: the greater the number of people subjected to physical monitoring devices, the greater the demand for equipment, infrastructure, maintenance, and related services. Migration policy thus begins to produce financial effects for private companies involved in the execution of surveillance.

When a public policy of immigration control is implemented through private contracts and involves a significant expansion in the demand for a certain type of equipment, it becomes necessary to examine more rigorously the incentives that permeate this relationship. Kocher draws attention precisely to this dimension when analyzing the expansion of physical devices and the role of the GEO Group. In his view, the policy may represent a shift towards more expensive and invasive technologies, even when less expensive and less restrictive alternatives have already demonstrated the ability to guarantee high levels of compliance with immigration requirements.

The contradiction is evident: if the stated objective of the program is to ensure that immigrants attend hearings and comply with administrative determinations, the imposition of more invasive devices does not necessarily seem to be accompanied by a proportional need. When a more expensive and intrusive technology replaces cheaper and less restrictive mechanisms without a corresponding change in the behavior of the individuals being supervised, the expansion requires a more robust public justification.

 

The humanitarian dilemma of a control policy

The debate over electronic monitoring needs to move beyond a simplistic opposition between “detention” and “freedom.” An ankle bracelet may, in fact, be less restrictive than physical imprisonment. This comparison, however, should not end the discussion. The fundamental question is whether the existence of a worse alternative, such as detention, automatically transforms any less severe measure into a humanitarian policy. The answer should not be affirmative. A policy can be less harmful than detention and still produce significant physical, psychological, economic, and social harm.

The National Immigration Forum itself, while acknowledging that electronic monitoring can be less restrictive than detention and have high hearing attendance rates, registers pertinent concerns about the physical effects, social stigma, difficulties in the labor market, and the privacy of the data collected. The organization also highlights that there was insufficient transparency regarding how the information obtained by ICE was used, who could access it, and for how long it would be stored.

This last issue becomes central in a context of expanding surveillance technologies. Real-time location data collection creates a detailed record of a person's movements and routine. When this type of data collection is expanded to tens of thousands of individuals, a political and legal question arises: what are the limits to transforming entire communities into permanently monitored populations?

The case of asylum seekers highlights this tension: many of the affected individuals are not accused of crimes, have work permits, have established families in the country, and have already demonstrated, to varying degrees, compliance with the requirements imposed by the immigration system. Yet, they may end up carrying a device that publicly associates them with criminality and restricts their freedom of movement.

Policy, therefore, needs to be analyzed not only by the number of people who attend hearings, but also by the human cost required to achieve that result. A high compliance rate does not automatically eliminate the impacts caused by a form of surveillance that can be disproportionate, stigmatizing, and imposed without individualized justification.

 

A dispute over the future of immigration policy

The lawsuit against ICE ultimately represents a dispute over the direction that U.S. immigration policy intends to take. On one hand, there is the possibility of developing less costly and less invasive surveillance systems capable of ensuring attendance at immigration procedures without transforming the individual's body into a permanent tracking platform.

On the other hand, the expansion of ankle bracelets and physical devices indicates a preference for more visible and intense forms of control. This choice is not neutral. It appears to communicate a particular conception of the relationship between the State and immigrants: instead of treating the asylum seeker as an individual awaiting the analysis of a legal claim, they are treated primarily as someone who needs to be permanently monitored.

The United States subjects many of these individuals to control mechanisms that can produce consequences similar to those of criminal punishment. A person fleeing persecution, violence, or threats may find, upon arriving in their destination country, a system that tracks them via GPS, restricts their mobility, and publicly exposes them to the stigma of a device associated with criminality.

Therefore, the debate should not be reduced to the question of whether an ankle bracelet is better or worse than a cell. The most important question is another: what level of surveillance is truly necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, and what limits should be imposed on the State when the supervised person has not demonstrated, through their behavior, the need for an escalation of control?

The legal action brought by asylum seekers places this question at the center of the debate. By challenging the automatic expansion of electronic monitoring, the authors question the idea that administrative efficiency can replace individual assessment. The question, therefore, is not only whether ICE can monitor. It is whether it can expand this monitoring in a generalized way, transforming a measure that should be exceptional into an almost normal condition of the migratory experience.

The answer requires recognizing that border management does not occur in a space separate from human rights. The pursuit of migration control does not eliminate the need for proportionality, transparency, and respect for the dignity of people subjected to the system.

When technology ceases to be used to reduce detention and begins to expand surveillance over individuals who already meet the State's requirements, the so-called "alternative to detention" risks becoming something different: not an alternative to incarceration, but a broader and more everyday form of control over the lives of migrants.